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The poet 19T9 period hah seen a ,sustained oyolieal 
oriels of the World Capitalist sdonanio eye tea whioh has
ns ~n Mvely affeoted most of the dependent third world
/
countries. hespite speculative favourable projections 
by the managers of the capitalist world economic sywtam 
(the world Bank add thi MP)» prospects of an upswing in  
the economic perfofflaaoe of HW poof and ecoaeoioally 
dependent third world dotfdtfie* (heereafter retired to an
t
the 9iWs) are vary deem indeed (World Bank, 1966a).
The legld ; of the World Bank ten it  that the recovery 
of the economies of JWOs'Will depend on the Improved 
' performance of the economies of the developed capitalist 
countries and changes in terms of trade in favour of 
primary commodities. Thus, according to the World Bank 
Report of 1986, the continued economic growth in the 
developed capitalist countries, theexpeeted fa l l  in 
the price of o il end favourable commodity prices 
particularly for ooffeewbuld a ll aat to stimulate 
eoonoaib growth in the eooacc&aally more disadvantaged 
countries. In fact as we Shall soap point out the JKfCe
8uro now being Ur,wd to impliment the so o llo d  
structural adjustment programmes (hereinafter refered 
to as SAPs) as those favourable conditions would minimize 
the social sufferings often Aacompenied by these changes 
and therefore, avert arises of a political nature 
(florid Biank: 1986* ).
Aa i t  is  now well known, the cyclical oriels has
continued to worsen* She OPEC countries foiled to agree
on a common strategy to lower the volume of production
of o il with subsequent rise in the price of o il (at
leaet the expected price reduetione never took place),
commodity prloee of the moat important j$7Cs agricultural
exports (coffee, cotton and tea) has remained the same
or even declined and the growth in the economies of the
developed countries has not improved thereby worsening
the external torus of trade between the developed and
1developing countries*
For the Southern African Region the post 1979
cyclical oriels of capitalism has taken place witiiin
\
the context o f  a very important stage o f the 3rd phase 
o f  the general C r is is  o f capitalism. In  Marxist 
lite ra tu re , a d istinction  is  normally made between 
cy c lio a l crises and the genral c r is is  o f capitalism.
3Whilt the fortier is recurrent and is generally Caused 
by the floaplonnod and profit oriented nature of Capitalism, 
the later la much more political and gradually leadd to 
the auooeea of shti-inporialist and progressive foroee in 
the world (Schilling, grasp of the two types
of crises is  important for understanding the relationship 
between the ongoing liberation struggles in the sub-region 
and the HOP imposed SAN.
. .. :V‘ .r/V: i , •
. r u  :*:v * * . • . * .
Briefly put, the first stage of the general orials 
of capitalism was ushered in by the 1917 Great Sooialist > 
Ootober Revolution of Russia* Uhls revolution, apart 
from effectively driving capitalism out of Russia, greatly 
stimulated and strengthened the struggle fwr political 
self-determination Asia. The^Second
World War (2./W) which was above a ll caused by the need 
to find a "permanent" eolutiop to the after effeos of 
the eyclioal crisis, of capitalism of the late 1920s and' 
early 1930s (the so called Great Depression) and aimed 
at eliminating the Soviet Union as the first sooialist 
state in the World in fact ended with the defeat of the  ^
most dangerous imperialist power (Germany) and the 
success of progressive forces/ *‘®ie bejgihning of what 
one oan call the World sooialist system. Its influence 
on international politics and particularly its  support 
for antl-oolonial struggles, weakened significantly 
capitalism and ushered in the seoond phase of the general 
crisis.
/4
.She third phnao nfld perhaps the uost interesting 
for our paper aone ith  the genertlisod onti«eolonial 
• " ' Struggles tooth; la  Aolsjond Afribband the svoeasful
* +  t H f ir l i f t n 1  n n W f i M i f r .  * * * * *
1979)» Interesting forpur paporie the toot that the ond of
» ' 1 :• '*
. /  w * olaBtioal oo^n.ioliflli?i wft*>t **>• ■soe timethe 
‘ beginning 01  a miry StOnf ps*$Sd of. the third phase ,
Of tho fMUtfal dAflifi of oopittUsm* Contrary to most 
». radical analysis, palltlo^JAdopondonoe 4$ft$sd the 
boot 8ooio--politioQl oontext tor the struggle tor the
* ' 1
national eoonooy, tor thejnatlon otete Xfonan,. 1963
i y
Shivji, 1=975 )*. c^trqdietlpn it^rei^t in neo-oolonial 
•eonomiee (new ooloniallitia) must ot necessity lead to 
geneaOlsed aanltnliBra forces end therefore,
to the deepening, o f thg 3rd phaie of the general. oriels of
capitalism* . I t  is this deepening of the general orisie of
oapitaliom wtijh the ^a^deaov for the progressive end 
pgolattrt forces to booodeinfluencial, that Constitutes 
the. ^biggest pro^len for i^pexialien in the Bagion.
Ihis wae wo?;o .80 with.the anoprent unity between 
the anti-colonial struytjee and jggS,lu^q§&
in the d&loyed ahti-eatonial struggles in Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia* the foot that the:programmes 
of most of the Parties leading the national, liberation
struggles in those countries emphasised the tjaed to establish
l
3Independent i«e* into grated srtd fielf-sustaining economies 
after the suooessful completion of the struggles did, 
indeed, threaten the long tofln oeononio intoreets of 
imporlalima ir*. the rogion* But perhaps even much more
disturbing for Imperialism eve the prospects for a
\
.majority ruled md anti-imperialist South Africa*
As is  .very well known, the ftopublio of South 
Afrioa has by and large oroeped the threshhold of
developed oountrioa* She economy of South Africa hah
!
the hdfihsfrft ao-officient of baokward end forward
/ "
linkages in the continent of Africa and while multi­
national corporation*! art dominant, her capacity to
‘ ' \ ' 
sustain her eoonony even in their absence la  very high
indeed (the. current v/ithdrawal by a number: o f multi­
national corporations and the svnle of their property 
and shares to "indigenous" capitalists can only strengthen 
even more the Bore regime)2. It  is  therefore, abundantly 
olear to imperialism that should the ongoing anti-apartheid 
struggles be r/oni by forces led by anti-monopoly capitalism 
and socialist forees (essentially a democratie revolution) 
then, progressive forees would take over a developed 
economy which would, giveft the continued existence of 
countries led by progressive forces In the region,‘ ’.be 
central in oreating a eonmuriity of powerful independent 
and progressive states in the region*
!
In Russia, tio.ilir linked the Buceoaa of the Great 
GctoberSoOlalist novolution to subsequent revolutions 
in the rest oif the nuoh more developed Surope- Sue to 
Various reasons sooinlish hod eventually to bo built in 
one country, thanks' mainly to :the Helmets of Riis'aia. 
tfe mould like to oubnlt liete that in the Southern Africem 
Region ao oi o il an in one country mill be extremely difficult 
to dohiovo m  tho .1 baches of a denboratio and socialist 
Republic-of South Africa* The lon& tern 'progrruamd'^ f
iiapariaXABm is prooiaely to prevent tMe eVoAtnAhilty' 4
\
from taking plaeo. , 'urftf
■ .■ • \:uu.S.
Thfoe tOonaiipc thot arf'Very nuoh x*late«%hn 
be identified in the Attempt by lnpexlalis^ to prevent 
an  ^pbeeibility 'of creating what one any call a broad 
uttite* front, of -nti^aeilaliM^.oountriea in Southern 
(I shall coiae back to this theme in the third pdrt of 
this paper) can bo identified.
(o ) £ nuoh s orter tern.scenarios is  to destabilise,
.. . through o rgan ise s o lita ry  activ ities ., the most 
: vocal progressive states* As vreehall poinjt out
a.o these. coiymtrieej despite -obvious meeknesses
,-kv t. .. in. th e ir  pqlioy formulations and- p o lit ic a l,
r; tui.v r.-ic i: <^ t^ 9*»lsr.tionJ,.vgre. t ip  pnly; countries that have 
dared tq. Gorae out with :a *olearer independent 
economic programme, Aimed destabilisation  is  
therefore aimed at making the implimentation
7or 'IhOf.iO policioo impossible end at generally 
maiding it  extremely difficult i f  not impossible 
for the otatos of those oountrida to deliver 
any pbor.cmie, benefits to the populaoe, thereby 
discrediting them.
t
(b ) Tho aocond scenario,  which is  much more of a
long torn nature and covers even mildly progressive 
st.- tes but states that also strongly support the 
liberation struggles in South Africa (e.g. Tanzania 
and Zambia), is the imposition of a clearly neo- 
colonial economic strategy (otherwise known as the 
Structural Adjustment Programme) on them. I f  
the first scenario succeeds in making a oountry
4 . .X' _ ’ .!—• it-.-
politic illy  told economically ineffective, then 
Imperialism would come up with an economic 
pro^npme , that would . ''help" the Country come 
out of the crisis brou^it about by ineffective 
"socialist" .and/or statist, polioles.(the 
y MofBambloan case). .
\
/
(c ) The third scenario, which is also of a long 
term nature, is  the need to influence the 
political content of liberation struggles to 
South Africa by making sure that enventually 
majority .rule w ill be dominated by oamprador 
bourgeoisie who . w ill mentoin tho sane econonic 
relations between South Africa and the developed 
capitalist countries.
0Indacd, rMKiU'irinuu tv.o and three aro very much related 
since "1 va.jority- rule in *.>outh Africa in which the oonpmdor 
bourgeoisie dcoin'to w ill moke euro that the root of the 
oouatriOB of n.'Utlr:i,5’i Africa w ill remain neo-colonial 
appendage of imperialism.
■ » • .
Let us finally  submit here that given the critical 
phase of liberation struggles the region 18 going through 
(l#e. the possibility of the liberation struggles in  
South Africa consolidating anti-imperialist forces) the 
structural Adjustment, 2*0grams now being imposed ty 
the Bn? and t/orld Deuik on a number of countries in the 
~ Region oan not be simply token as being politically  
neutral ecouomio programmes* She paper, therefore, 
intends to hbfcLsve three things t
‘ (a ) to c lonrly  demonstrate that the po licy  issues
contained iH the 3AP ^ paokage are intended to
consolidito ca p ita lis t and oamor-dor forces
in  those countries, forced that do not generally 
support the national liberation  struggles.
W J L to  argue that although at the le v e l o f
long term period Ijhese classes and strata o f
Qlaises w i l l  be perhaps the most negatively
9The introduction of a eystea that encourages the 
forces of the market and completely leaves the 
poor strata of the population at its  mercy 
has in itia lly  a tendency. Moreover
as sk ill soon show, most of the programmes are 
00 politically unpopular that they can only be 
impUmented by a State that must of necessity 
' adopt faeoist tendencies. It  should however, 
he emphasised that the states that have always 
been at the forefront in supporting the national 
' liberation, struggles are those that have been 
able tp mentain animpressively hl#i level of 
• popular, support. In many ways, the SAPs aims 
at removing this .support*C
bapor  w ill attempt; to.provide an
----  .. alternative to the! 3APs. by-arguing that an
------- .........  economic pxogramme based on and supported by
a broad united front of anti-monopoly (imperialist) 
states in  tfci r ^ # o | t is  the only effective solution 
to the current onslaught by imperialism.
2. The eoonomlc oriels. It s Bvamtoae and the BSF Medicine
A quick look at the econosd.ee of three oountrlee 
particularly after 1979 shows similar symptoms of what suet 
certainly be the 3ame economic "disease’'. The bone of
\10
eontontion between tho World Bank -  IMP experts and the
Ilka minded on the one hand and the progressive and/or
potrlotio intellectuals has boon the need to currently
oomprehand the true character of the economic crisis*
•
Indeed| any property trained political economist 
irrespective of his political inclinations would ■ 
certainly agree with most of the World Bank -  IMF observations 
on the symptoms of tho eoonomio malaiso that has orippled 
moot of the ooonbHeV of the Southern African countries*
Beyond this however, the two must part ways (Wagao, 1986),
Let us perhaps summartfe these eymptomo about which 
So much has been written and Baid over the last eigat 
yoars also* Por. the purpose of our paper, four symptoms 
would seem to be central.
2.1. J Booling- in  t he Volume o f  Exports o f Primary Commoditjea -  
fflftlnly affllcu ltural products ( the exception is  Zamta-^  
where copper-and ccbnlt are the, a ^ ont exnnrfa^
In a ll the three oountries, the volume of exports 
of the primary commodities has been declining over the last 
fifteen., years also. In Tanzania forexample, CQffeo production 
declined from 60,000 tons in 1973 to 50,000 tons in 1963, 
ootton from 64,500 tons in 1972 to 40,000 in .1983, eisal 
from 217f000 tons in.. 1970 to 27f000 tons in 1983 and cashewnuts 
from' 114,000 tons in 1974 to 11,000 tons in 1983(MuJuni, 1986:12).
11
]?or Up*ambiquof a country; that has been, on a 
poxnanont .war footing,, the performanefr inthe volume of 
merited ( agricultural production between 1975 and 1984 
has been disastrous, IDs table below best summarises
the situation.
g jf lf  U Martotel Aartoultural Produotjoni Selected
p m 8 (laongmfli
■ 1975 1981 1982 1983
19S4
Export Crops
.  •-
Cehswnuta 1$0 ,0  *v 90*1 57.0 18.1 25*5
Rets cotton 92,0 73*7 60,7 24.1 19,7
• • « v.«Jl.25*'®'~ '■'W-73,7 •39*?
Tea 59,1 99*2-V^ 1 0 9 .7 - *51.1
5 9 .8
Timber 199*0 93.3 53.8 33,5 44*5
S isa l 340*0 233i-8 139*9 122*4 136 ,6
.. ; - 5 4 .4 - 36.6 30.7 24.8
Food Crops’
. . • • „ •
Rice 94.0 28.9 41.5 ,17.3 19,8
Maize 95.0 78.3 8 9 ,2 55.8
82,6
is  . fif i v. 9 '.'-Jr f '• • • V-. I .* •Beans U'.O' *14.9 6.9 4*7''
:W'1V5
Horticultures ■ 4.0 6 .8 5.6 X 7.9
20*0
1984 ss
f t  o t
28,1 
26*7 
22,2  
60*5 
47*5
50,4
48*6
Source i . • Mozambican Rational Commission, 1985
I
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C
Ono thing th.it is  oloaf'from the above production 
figuros io the -fact that both in fansania and Mot'ambiqud :j i: 
the performance of the acat iaport foreigp. exchange aapening 
crops has not boeniqpto salve and therefore, that as a means 
to restructure the economy, It  l l  extremely Important to 
Improve the existing levels of production. Although we shall 
ooas back to this pokit vrs weiad^lllill to 'clearly point out 
that the need to increase the ■gbltiii primary commodities 
can not constitute an important aiamant of the structural
imKB____■ ..-ayt"--**-’* * * - * '1* * * 1
_ adjustasaxt of a^dapendsnt-wowiony at the World Bank would 
like to make ns believe (World Bank, 1981, 1984, 1988), At 
best, it  oan constitute part»~of-a |jjg programme 
of a muoh more fundamental structural transformation 
strategy of the inherited economy* '  .
i* ■ *
2* 1 ,2  Increasing government expenditure A*d inefficient
a i w °  -
* 4 • I
. .« «
’ \ 1 '
In almost every W0J»xd Bank Report since the 1981 
9 1
report.titled "Accelerated Devalottment In Sub-Stth^
An Agenda for Action, the recurrent theme has always been 
the need to strengthen the private sector as the most
a  * * *  % -
efficient sector in distributing the benefits of growth
* -v * ■» t
through the free market mechanism (World Bank, 1906(a): 3),
.  • ■'»
V. • '••• % *
It  is  indeed true that for moat of African countries the
* « • * i - ♦ . “ J i
administration ,rsector" consumes a substantial amount of the 
GDP and yet its  impact on productivity and consequently on 
raising the standard of living is  minimal.
13
-'HaVti'"*',: ver •awx '^lreA t^htil
like to submit that tills- prdjiMrfflity for tbs administration 
sector to consume a substantial amount of GDP has in most
- ... ^ a S M -» » -t o ~ ^ ^ t h  the trfflBitmtiyififeffiQient' a fil'o o rfi^ r ' ~
. comprador bourgeoisie who hold higi positions than the ■ 
assumed natural lneffjolcaicy, Qf...Stet€Lnwned institutions*—
I f  the state owned economic ventures were managed efficiently  
they wpuld not only ensure their own extended aoproduetion
but would also support the so oalled free sorvioee badly
. . .  ■ " ■ • ■ • . • ■ ■ *
needed by the poor peasant and workers* ,„■ * • • - . . .  ■
(Tanzania provides the beet example of. Inefficiently * . •» * » •
run state owned institutions which over the years have become 
a big burden to the tax payers* Most of them hpve survived 
thanks .to bank loans and state subventions* The table • . . 
below shows amount of money (in  terns of subventions) given, 
by the state, profits made by the Parastatels and their
••• . . . . . -^ jd . . r ^ . - - -  • ** — —............................... - **-*--• * . . . «
contribution to the CEDP,
14
Table. Tamsanlen State fiynport to Eafttftptals
Year
State
Subvent­
ion
Contribution 
t*m .) 
Hraatatalo
Beal transfer 
"'frdm'thi''states.;
to Earastetalsr^ ,r 1.: ...
J»arastata33»
iso fitr-
Oontrl-
*%oy>m
% to 
GEDP
• •:tr , re • - ■ './.>.•! s ■-
1973 4ft>;7 s: " ' 85.2 ■ 335.S, /; 626.3’' 1249.2' 11,9
1974 625:,3iJ
•’if--’ rvao;! 
106,1
'j.-t UO^'iijO (>a : Jj i;.' 
519.4 r"750*#- 15.0
1975 1314.3 75.1 1239.2 855.9 1719-3 10 ,1
1976 1189.4 95.1 . rt t "':lC93*9 1 1008.0 1972.9 9.1
1977 1167.1 113,6 1053.5 • 1492.7 i 1492.7 9.5
1978 159®,1L !"-r' 200*0 -J' ■' '1398.7 2312V9 I 3716.5 13,0
1979 1293.3 - ; i 210.2" 1083.4^ 1899.6 j;37a,6'' 11,7
1980 1367*1 '142,7 •' 12*4*4 ,v > 2100.6 * "5073.0 13.5
1981 1689,1 ’ 199,0 ‘ " 1f490;i • . 2725.6 "5662*6 13.6
1982 2971*3 '• 347.0' ' ' £624.6■" 3458.6’ | 73&7i0
!.. .... .♦ •
14.0
Source j Ministry of Finance- and Economic Affairs, Implimentation of _• 
tho policy of Socialism and Self-reliance in the economic and 
finance sectors, paper presented to the symposium on Twenty 
Years of Arusha Declaration, Dar os Salaam, 1987.
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The above tr-Me nhows clotirly thr.t since 1973 the 
state has been giving much more to the parastatals than 
what i t  received from them. I t  would be very d if f ic u lt  
fo r  any analyists or po licy  maker to argue fo r  the 
continued support o f parastatals that can not ensure 
extended reproduction from th e ir  own surplus value* But 
as we already said before, a combination o f  p o lit ic a l and 
technical e ff ic ien cy  on part o f those who rur3 the 
parastatals can make them profitab le* Parastatals 
particu larly  in  certain key sectors are extremely important 
fo r  reproduction o f a nation -.’•e economy, including private 
economic ventures*
2*1.3 Low Producer Prioas and Low Investments In  the 
Agricu ltural sector
\ ' * ' 1
With*the:possible exception, o f the:Republic, o f 
South A fr ica  the rest-;of the Southern African countries 
depend predominantly on '.the agricu ltural see tor* and. on the 
small holders who .are the dominant; pro ducers *. Any sound 
agricu ltural p o licy  must accept th is concrete; re a lity  when 
formulating pric ing and inputs po lic ies . . Producer prices 
should be high enough to oover the cost o f production o f the 
small holders-and enable them t o 'buy the most essential ’ 
incentive g o o d s A n d  likew ise, mors cap ita l should be 
invested in- the 'agricu ltura l sector: and within th is sector 
to  t ^ :  amsdl holders, pa£&</uiarly those producing; food crops.
1«
lloat of the post-independence Southern African Countries 
have however invwrced more In Import substitution industries 
and have formulated prloa polloles that have led to a severe 
solssore ozlses i«a« increasingly the Internal terms of trade 
hale worked against the rural areas and this has in turn 
dlaooaraged the snail holderwt to produce more bash ozops 
and fbod^ropa*
In fansania# a country teost policies have formally 
emphasised agricultural production* the poet 1967 period 
(whan the country aonounced jtha progressiva Arusha Deolara- 
tion policy sow a eytteoatie neglect of this important 
sector of the eoonooy* The percentage of the total annual 
inveatnsnt that went~to agriculture decreased from a high 
level of 29«1$-In 1975/76 ‘tTH 'iO i’ Htfii'imr level of 7«5$ 
in 1979/80 (Msambiohakn et a l. 1983i 43* It  was only after
the intervention of thd DIF, for reasons that have nothing to do 
with the interests, of the small holders, that the percentage 
was restored to the 1975/76 level in the budget year of 1984/85, 
Since then' percentage has averaged at 29$ of total annual 
investments*. .
The price levels as i t  has been well documented 
by B ill Pranlc PranJa . 1979) were a
prioe levels at the international motet ondoould nbt- cover 
the cost of production insured /by. the peasants*: *
17
In Mozambique on the other handy the poet 1977 
(after the 3rd JHELDIO CONGRESS) policies wrongly emphasised 
a socialist pro gramas (a  maximum programae) when concrete 
conditions dictated that a democratic programme (a  miwinttm 
programme) be adopted, Consequently, most investments went 
into lhrgs softie state fame and disregarded the email holders 
and Co-Operative fame* In 1982 .for example f 90$ of the 
centrally planned investments in agriculture went Into state 
farms ahd the reoaining l ^  waa shored between the smell holders 
and oo-operatives (®«*pft -„1984.)*i__
Zambia whose economy la hSavely dependent an copper 
experts spends far leee In agriculture than the mining sector* 
In the 1980-1984 period only 1 1 , 1$ of the total Investments 
went into the agricultural sector while 3 1*5$ 'went''into the 
mining sector and projections for the period 1986-90 envisage 
10*0$ and.22^0$ respectively (ROZ, 1&86: 35)i
She net result of these lopsided investment policies
* V ' -
in favour of import substitution Industries and within the 
agricultural seotor, in favour of cash crops and ^ large scale 
farms has not only led to a drastic fa ll  in food crops 
production but has politically marginalised the man holders 
and seriously eroded the confidence of the peasants in their 
Governments* And their confidence is  a conditio ainanm  ^nnq 
for the successful support of the liberation struggles in 
Southern Africa* Set us in passing point out that the emphasis
18
put by the World Bank and the OB?on better producer prloes 
'' SUtdA ooonamlo mechanism of "free” competition does not 
* elm at proteoting the smallholders and at least in the 
- medium end long texts context may hate a far more damaging 
Impact on the popular support td the national liberation 
-etxugglde# I shall oame back to thie point whan dlsouaaing
• , t •
iJr:IMP oonditioaaUtiea. r.x -vb-
♦ : • ■ ' ■ .1 .
• ";i*v / ■ ;:<v ' r('; ; //.r.
^ •1 ,4  . t«»t^iaer0^a«^<»ir,nt.i|Y M ^ ian 3n the Import
Substitution induetriea -c c -
She Import substitution industrialisation strategy was
‘ . ’>■ ■ vIf- • -u>
adopted by almost a ll independent Southern African Countries 
largely'on the World Bank advioe. In Tanzania, the import 
substitution industrialisation Strategy was incorporated in the 
First Five Year Flan (1984-1969) following a World Bank report 
of I960* Import eubetitution, industries though meant to lessen 
the dependency an Imported consumer goodie are themselves high 
import dependent (in  texme of machines and spare parts) and 
have very lit t le  backward and forward linkages internally* la  
Inability to sustain a certain acceptable level of exports 
(basically of primary commodities) can lead to a severe 
reduction in capacity utilization of these type of industries
- ■ ,ri ■ '"iv ■ •1 : ■ " v!/ --.i
and, th is is  What has been happening in  the three countries* 
Pa rticu la rly  since the ongoing cy c lica l c r is is  started. In 
Tanzania, Capacity u t ilis a tio n  has been at around 30$ since
'* --V> - * -• ■ i .: --H* - ' ' y. \
1979 leading to severe consumer goods shortages* •
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On the basis of these developmental the moat recent 
World Bank report (l987$);.ad1rioes particularly the ao called 
least developed oountries to put more emphasis on export 
oriented (basically of primary comoodities) economic policies 
as an important element of the SAB* Aa weshall point out in 
greater detail later, what the World Bank now wishes to impose.
On these oountries id the worst form of the eo called export 
led economies -  i*e. growth through the export pf primary 
commodities* The implications of this policy given the 
unreliability of favourable external terms of trade are very
_ _____________ _■ .J-
clear* Bvan the more "fcnrtwaafce" oountrlee of the fax**east 
Asia, the so called newly i»M ^ tria li*^ g  «ount^ ("fortunate" 
in the sense that their export led growth has been based an 
"redeployed" industries from the developed capitalist oountries) 
are now increasingly coming against unpeaetretable ta riff cod 
zion taraJif walls«(Aoin 1980).
. Having made a brief survey of the symptoms of the crisis 
i whose feasts the SAPS have been based, let us briefly  
review the most important el«aentiB' of this .programme* As 
pointed out in our introduction,. this part of the paper --- 
aims at doing three things; ( t ‘ nv >•
( l )  to argue that the basic thrust of the programme is  to 
consolidate capitalism and has nothing to do WUtth 
the interest of the popr workers and peasants.
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( 2) to point out that the type of capitalist being suggest 
is  that whioh w ill consolidate and strengthen dependency 
relational and
( 3 ) in relation to the Southern Afrioan Region, the 
programs alas at consolidating reactionary elements 
in the Parties and Governments of the most outspoken 
anti-apartheid countries and breaking the w ill of the 
popular masses to support the liberation process*.
2.2 The IMP ConditinnAlities -  nnliev nnascrintinn fo r
continued Aftnry^ ryio dependency in the Southern African 
Region*
IH this part, we shall limit ourselves to those aspects 
of the conditionalities that most clearly aim at strengthening 
economic dependency and at breaking the w ill of the popular 
masses to support the liberation process*
2.2*1 The over-valued exchange rate and "incentive" p o lic ie s ?
The most prominent argument In almost every World 
Bank report sinco 1981 has centered around the issue of 
over-valued exohangs rate which is a said to have created 
a lot of imbalances in the economy* This, has in particular 
negatively affected the export performance of primary commodities. 
Revaluation has therefore, been seen as the most important policy 
instruments in the SAP. * It is  often argued Ifhat Idas devaluation 
of the local currency accompanied with market oriented jnetmt-t-ynH
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to the peasants, w i l l  Improve the performance o f the agricu ltural 
sector, Every do lla r earned, through the export o f  agricu ltural 
products, i t  i s  argued, W ill earn more lo ca l currency which would 
enable ^ cou n try  to pay more producer prices#:
This po licy  argument is  c losely  linked with the 
removal o f both urban and rural incentives -  urban in re la tion  
•to-food subsidies and rural, in  re lation  to inputs subsidy#
The argument is  often made to the e ffe c t  that the devaluation 
' exercise would be in e ffe c tiv e  i f  a substantial amount o f 
lo ca l currency goes into supporting the urban population rather 
into increasing the le v e l o f agricu ltural producer prices#
In relationship to inputs subsidies, i t  is  .argued that in  
most oases the d istribution  o f the subsidized inputs has not 
been e f f ic ie n t  and had led to more .administrative costs which 
had to be paid* fo r  by reducing the le v e l o f producer prices
While we are agreed that fo r  the three countries 
being discussed the producer prices were fo r  the
minimum required to motivate the peasant to produce more, increased 
' producer prices through devaluation does not alwa.vB lead to 
increased agricu ltural production (filalima, 1982). In a number 
o f  cases, due to the ever fluctuating terms o f trade (o ften  
against primary commodities) planned high producer prices fo r  
the next season have to- be met by sh iftin g  the internal 
terms o f trade against the urban areas (through increased 
food prices ) or even by Government bank borrowing.^
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The. removal o f input subsidies in  the rural areas 
works against the poor peasants who can bardly afford  the
ever inoreaSiug costs o f  key inputs and while peasants are 
responsive to  higher prices and may in i t in l lv  increase production, 
tliiB can only bo a temporary development as i t  increasingly
becomes more expensive to reproduce the f e r t i l i t y  o f the :ci 
s o i l  on.an. extended basis given the small sise o f land and
•U* ' VV
pipohibitive prices fo r  better and simple tools (e .g . the
\v; ; if;. ; ' ^
..plough)*;; In the absence of an effective land reform programme 
, ( and this .ia not a popular polioy for the World Bank and Co.1)
th e lite ra lia a t io n  o f the d istribution  o f  inputs and the ever 
increasing costs nap. only increasingly marginalise the small 
holders. In  fact; despite the-many nice words about th is 
.. stratum o f peasants by the; World Bank Reports, the medium 
to, long teim ob jective o f  the SAP is  p rec ise ly  to replace 
i t  by the r ich  and ca p ita lis t farmer.
While th is eventuality may increase the volume 
o f agricu ltural production, experience elsewhere has shown 
that the marginalisation o f the majority o f the peasantry 
Without corresponding^employment opportunities in  industries
can only increase the aimy o f the unemployed in  the rural
areas and. th is , as i t  is  often the case is  accompanied by
--: 4 v.>\
acute soc ia l crisps.
The linkage between the removal o f food subsidies 
fo r  the urban population and the increase .of producer prices 
fo r  agricu ltural crops is  perhaps one o f the most controversial
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acpeet.jof the I2JDP cond itionalities. The World Bank and 
the IMP under increasing pressure from the socia l crises 
broutfit about by this po licy , have o f  la te  become increasingly 
defensive. In the ir desperate attempt to enforce this po licy , 
the two institu tions are now speculating with the state o f 
a ffa irs  o f the "World"’ economy. I t  has recently been argued 
that the year 1986 was going to be the "year o f  opportunity" 
fo r  both A frica  and the donors because o f the then expected 
decline in  o i l  prices and good weather conditions. In  the 
words o f the World Sank.
Recovery from the drought has brought 
lower food p rices , end imported petroleum, 
w i l l  be cheaper because o f the decline in  
o i l  p rices. This makes 1986 a good year 
fo r  A frica  to accelerate i t s  process o f 
correcting overvalued exchange rates; 
lower, food and petroleum prices w i l l  
Soften the inflationary..impact o f devaluation 
on urban dwellers; at the same time, 
devaluation would help raise the farm 
prices o f agricu ltural export and partly  . 
o ffs e t  tlqe, e ffe c ts  o f lower food prices on 
farmers (The Woiid Bank, I986;bi55 oar 
emphasis). . .... ^
In the world cap ita lis t economy.controlled by the hi-inri 
forces o f supply .and .demand, economic projections are 
mere speculations. We now know that the year 1986 was another 
very bad year fo r  A frica  with o i l  prices remaining constant 
or r is in g  and coffee prices fa l l in g  rather r is in g  than 
as expected. The only consolation perhaps are the good rains 
and these can not be guaranteed every year. Indeed, the food 
r io ts  in  Zambia and subsequent strikes by a broad cress section 
o f  workers took place during th is year and are s t i l l  going onJ
24
In an attempt, to lessen the negative impact o f 
devaluation on the poor people and restore some element 
o f economic planning the government Zambia introduced a 
'managed1 floa tin g  exchange rate system i^i which the 
Kwacha is  pegged to a basket o f currencies pf..Zambia's 
"loading trading partners. Under the ayctioning eyBtem 
forced on Zambia by the IMP the value o f kwacha against the do llar 
went as low es ZK 15*33. a # 1* She "new" system has fixed  
an upper and lower lim it between which bidders fpir foreign  
exchange can operate -  ZK 9,00 and ZK 12.50 (A frican Business, 
A p ril 1987 No* 14s 20).
Tanzania and Mozambique have also adopted no less 
destructive exchange rate systems and the across the board 
removal o f food subsidies w i l l  sooner or la te r  lead to severe 
socia l orises as the patience o f the people get exhausted.
Tanzania did, fo r  example, adopt the, so ca lled  fle x ib le  
•exchange rate regime, •’’which ro ly  on supply and demand in 
the foreign  exchange market to determine the exchange 
ra te" (The World Bank 1986b 16). When Tanzania adopted
the IMP reform package in  June 1986 the exchange rate 
was T.shs.40:# 1 and in  A p ril 18th, 1987 i t  was T.shs,58*55:# 1 .
Mozambique, economically exhausted by the apartheid 
supported MNH ba'uiits has also been forced to take the IMP 
medicine. I t  recently devalued her grossly over-valued 
currency from MM40 = # 1 to MM200 = $ 1 (buying) and MM 204 = &
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so ilin g  and reduced subsidies on food and essentia l socia l 
services although prices fo r  producer and consumer prices 
o f staple foods w i l l  continue to be cen tra lly  fixed 
(A frican Business, 1987).
Let us emphasize here that we are not simply 
against devaluation and anti-subsidy p o lic ies  but are 
certa in ly  against economic reform p o lic ies  that at 
removing sovereiga ity over the economies o f  our countries* 
Floating exchange rate systems ('•managed" or vowmanaged) 
make any sound eoonamic planning impossible and leave the 
fa te  o f our economies to the whims o f the forces o f supply
, i r •
and demand. On the other hand, qcross the board removal 
o f  subsidies which does not seek to d istribu tive the burden 
o f the recovery programmes according to the d ifferen t leve ls  
o f inoomes can only lead to socia l chaos with even more 
negative consequenciee on the performance o f our economies*
2.2.2 In terest rate po licy  and cred it call-bias
The introduction o f higher in terest rates is  intended 
to reduce the le v e l o f  investments expenditures by making i t  
expensive to borrow money (cap ita l funds) and by so doing 
f in a l ly  reduce in fla tion . Likewise, cred it ce ilings 
imposed on banks is  also supposed to achieve the same 
purpose. In practice, higher in terest rates and credit 
ce ilin gs  have tended to discriminate the poor peasants and 
urban artisans and have made i t  extremely d i f f ic u lt  fo r
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the commercial bonks to advance loans to marketing cooperatives 
bo badly needed to buy crops from the peasants. Apart from 
removing any remaining autonomy by locals commercial banks , 
this aspect of the IMF conditionality has the medium, to long 
term "project1' of consolidating big farmers for, it  is  they 
who are better placed to afford loans with high interest 
rates.
Indeed Zambia, faced by declining levels of 
investments has had to revise the original IMF imposed 
interest rates from 30$ to 20% (the Bank of Zambia) while 
commercial bank rates now range between 21$ and 25$. This 
docrease is  supposed to encourage investments in agriculture 
euad spall scale industries.
2,2*3 The export led growth, an anti-industrialization 
strategy
An interesting aspect of the SAP3 is the simplistic 
approaoh-tewarda -the ©^ert-led-«trategy Which, • in relationship 
to sub-Saharan Africa, would seem to condemn most countries 
of this sub-iregion $56 exporters of agricultural crops. For 
the World Bank and the IMF, export led growth strategy is  
seen as an end and not as a' means to create internal investment 
Capacities in  industries that are integrative and self-sustaining. 
Indeed in most cases the advice is  not to -restore installed 
tsapScities of key industries (via an effective export promotion 
policy) but to abandon them.
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This "a<lvico" comes up very c lea r ly  in  the World 
Bank special report on Sub-Sahara A frica  o f 1986 which 
argues againot the "white elephants" projects i . e ,  s tee l 
• m ills and re fin eries . In the words o f th is report*
The area with the greatest potentia l in  
much o f A frica  is  agtlcu lture. With- : 
improvement in  agricultural prices and
increased ,availahLlity o f  imported raw 
materials and basic consumer..goods, the 
agricu ltural output can be eaq?eoted to 
grow by 4 percent a year dyxdng 1985^90 
S im ilarly, industries and services, ,xir 
particu larly  linked to agriculture, w i l l  
benefit from increased investments and 
imports# In some areas o f industry^for 
example# st/vil m ills  and re fin e r ie s ) and 
some services ( fo r  example government 
services)# a oftase o f  -contraction may be 
a necessary part o f adjustment fo r  
sustained development (my emphasis, World 
Bank, 1986(b)s 24).
As we shall point out in  our concluding part, we 
do not think that there i s  any contradiction between iron 
and s tee l industries and chemical industries on the one 
hand and the agricultural sector on the other. Indeed, 
the two are complimentary and provided that the Southern 
African countries adopt a regional approach to heavy 
industria lization  (to  avoid market and inputs supply ( 
problems) th is strategy could very w ell be the most 
e ffe c t iv e  and most sustainable.
/
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2.2.4 The 11.1 pint1 management o f the 3APe
This b r ie f review o f the IMP cond itionalities 
would be incomplete without a few words about the management 
o f the fore ign  "aid" that ia  accompanied by the SAPs, The 
most disturbing aspect o f the SAPs fo r  anybody concerned 
about the. sovereignity o f our countries and the continued 
support o f national libera tion  struggle in  the region is  
the linkage between increased foreign aid and foreign 
control o f  sensitive economic institu tions.
SAPs are normally^accompanied by experts from the 
World Bank and/or the IMP-who f i x  cred it ce ilin gs , 
quarterly financia l controls -and v ir tu a lly  run a l l  the 
key m in istries. Ofcourse the World Bank has i t s  own 
euphenism fo r  th is increased control -  "technical vj 
assistance"* The moat recent World Bank Report on 
Sub-Saharan countries gives the fa llow ing advice:
To this end, the African Countries must 
strengthen th e ir core m inistries o f finance 
and planning, and the units that coordinate 
tfeeix forei-gn- assistance. Better coordinat­
ion within the government -  between the 
central bank, the m inistries o f finance 
and planning, and the sectoral m inistries -  
is  also necessary. Such improvements may 
b a ll fo r  technical assistance from outside 
and such assistance is  read ily  available 
from the 'World Bank. UNDP, or b ila te ra l 
and agencies. Some countries have made 
pr&gcess in th is1 area ( for  example.
Zambia) but mos't s t i l l  have a long way 
to go. (My emphasiB. World Bank. 1986(b):45).
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A fte r  what has recently happened in  Zambia,
Sudan and Zaire (food r io ts , conplite breakdown o f low 
and order and avail tlie f a l l  o f a President) the other 
coUhtrles would be i l l  advised to gp thus fa r i African 
countries-, and Southern African countries in  particu lar, 
must find out other mechanisms o f  re-organising the ir 
neO'Colonial economies without re-colonization which Is  
what the World Bank and IMP are try ing to achieve.
3. I s  a s e if-re lia n t "structural adjustment programme11
possible?
As we pointed out in  our introductory remarks,
SAPs in  the Southern African Region have an obvious p o lit ic a l 
oqntent i . e .  pre-empt the emergence o f a sub-regional power 
Within the context o f a democratic front of. anti-monopoly 
onnitA iist forces which would be strengthened by a democratic 
and m ajority ruled South A frica*
SAPs implimented at the le v e l o f individual countries 
(and i t  has been on th is basis) tend to weaken e ffe c t iv e  
regional economic integration* They discourage types o f 
industries that would only be possible and e ffe c t iv e  i f  
constructed under a regional plan* In th is way SAPs tend 
to encourage the co-ordination o f Import substitution 
industries and export economies (prim arily o f  agricu ltural 
creps) .  The SAPs would therefore, tend to encourage the 
current regional Integration strategy o f  SADDC which is  basica lly  
based on attempts to co-ordinate dependent economic structures.
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While the "export led " growth strategy should 
continue to be emphasized as a minimum programme, increased 
foreign  exchange earned should be used to invest in regional 
industrial projects that would increasingly make the sub­
region independent in  the supply^of machines and agricultural 
inputs* This maximum programme is  however, extremely d i f f ic u lt  
to rea lize  i f  the liberation  struggles going on in  South A frica  
w i l l  not eventually be won by democratic forces -  i . e .  c lea r ly  
anti-im peria list forces. A democratic South A frica , with a 
h ifgily developed economy would certain ly fa c i l i ta te  the process 
o f creating a w ell integrated and self-sustain ing regional 
economy -  a rea l 'threat to monopoly capitalism. For this 
however to take place -Southern African countries must res is t 
structural adjustment programmes that*marginalize the 
popular forces without whose support libera tion  struggles 
in  South A frica  and Namibia w i l l  be d i f f ic u lt .
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